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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2004, Governor Jim Rowland of Connecticut resigned in the
1
midst of scandal. He was accused of accepting lavish gifts and
political contributions from state government contractors in
2
exchange for awarding government contracts. In response to this
scandal, Connecticut passed one of the most comprehensive state
3
ethics reform bills in recent years. Among other things, the new
law flatly prohibits a wide range of individuals associated with state
contractors from making political contributions to a wide range of
4
state candidates.
Connecticut’s law is just one recent example of legislation
aimed at eliminating so-called “pay-to-play” between state
contractors and state political candidates. Several states have
1. See, e.g., The Week, NATIONAL REVIEW, July 12, 2004 “After a prolonged
corruption scandal, Connecticut governor John Rowland resigned rather than face
certain impeachment by the legislature . . . .”); Fred Bayles, Scandal-plagued Conn.
governor to resign, USA TODAY, June 22, 2004, at 3A; Amy Fagan, Governor resigns;
Ethics Scandal Ousts Rowland of Connecticut, WASH. TIMES, June 22, 2004, at A01;
Connecticut Gov. Rowland Resigns; John G. Rowland Leaving Office Amid Gift-Taking
Scandal, CBS NEWS.COM, June 21, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07
/01/politics/main627067.html. Rowland later pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to a prison term for taking bribes. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo, Ex-Connecticut Governor
Gets 1 Year in Prison for Corruption, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2005, at A03; Matt Apuzzo
& John Christoffersen, Former Gov. Rowland Gets a Year in Prison for Graft, USA
TODAY.COM, Mar. 18, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-03-18rowland_x.htm.
2. See generally sources cited supra note 1.
3. See An Act Concerning Comprehensive Campaign Finance Reform for
State-Wide Constitutional and General Assembly Offices, 2005 Conn. Acts P.A. 055 (Spec. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-601 to 9-674 (Supp. 2007)),
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/ACT/PA/2005PA-00005-R00SB-02103SS3
-PA.htm.
4. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g)(1)(F) (Supp. 2007).
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enacted such laws. This article begins by providing a high-level
overview of the types of laws state legislatures have passed, focusing
on six states with generally applicable pay-to-play laws:
Connecticut, Kentucky, New Jersey, Ohio, South Carolina, and
5
West Virginia.
The article then discusses the First Amendment issues raised
by these state laws.
Although the right to make political
contributions is not entitled to the same high-level scrutiny as other
First Amendment rights, limits on contributions nevertheless must
6
be “closely drawn” to a “sufficiently important state interest.” The
Supreme Court has held that combating corruption, including
7
quid pro quos, is a sufficient state interest. Nonetheless, some of
the pay-to-play laws in force do not appear to be closely drawn to
this interest. Therefore, they impair the rights of those who seek to
participate in the political process through political contributions.
This article analyzes the laws of the six states surveyed and
asserts that the laws of Connecticut and New Jersey may be
unconstitutionally overbroad. They prohibit contributions from
individuals only marginally related to state contracts to recipients
who may not be in a position to act on the award of a state
8
contract. This article concludes that states passing pay-to-play laws
should tailor the reach of such laws to focus on those contributors
and recipients closely related to state contracts. States also can
build additional safeguards into pay-to-play legislation by requiring
5. This article does not discuss pay-to-play laws in many states that are
focused on a particular industry. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 10-2A-70.1, –70.2
(LexisNexis 1999) (regulating contributions from public utilities regulated by the
Public Services Commission); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 19981–82 (Supp. 2007)
(regulating contributions to the Gambling Control Commission); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18, § 2304(6) (1999) (regulating contributions from insurance companies to
the Insurance Commissioner); FLA. STAT. § 106.082 (2002) (regulating
contributions from vendors who do business with the Commissioner of
Agriculture); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1505.2(L) (Supp. 2007) (regulating
contributions from persons associated with the gaming industry); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 409.107 (2001) (regulating contributions from an entity serving as financial
underwriter, financial advisor, or investment advisor for a State Highway and
Transportation Commission bond); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402:43 (2005)
(regulating contributions from insurance companies); N.M. STAT. § 10-11130.1(B) (2003) (regulating contributions from contractors with the Public
Employees Retirement Board).
6. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2491 (2006) (plurality op.) (citing
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
7. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25–27 (1976). See also infra Part IV.A.
8. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g) (Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:44A20.15, –20.16 (Supp. 2007).
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open and competitive bidding of state contracts or by prohibiting
earmarked contributions.
II. PAY-TO-PLAY LEGISLATION IN GENERAL
The aim of state pay-to-play legislation is to eliminate political
quid pro quos; i.e., state contractors giving political contributions
to state candidates in exchange for favorable treatment in awarding
9
state contracts. The states surveyed vary in how broadly they
define “state contractor” (i.e., the contributor) and “state
candidate” (i.e., the recipient).
States also take different
approaches in determining the types of contracts that would make
a state contractor subject to the law. This section discusses the
contributors, recipients, and contracts targeted by the laws of
Connecticut, Kentucky, New Jersey, Ohio, South Carolina, and
West Virginia.
A. Contributors Targeted
State laws that apply to the narrowest category of contributors
subject only the state contractor itself to pay-to-play laws and do not
apply to natural persons (unless, of course, the state contractor is a
natural person). The laws of South Carolina and West Virginia are
two examples. For instance, South Carolina’s pay-to-play law
extends to a “person who has been awarded a contract with the
10
State, a county, a municipality, or a political subdivision thereof.”
This law appears, at least facially, to apply only to the actual entity
entering into the state contract. Thus, unless the state contractor

9. For instance, the New Jersey state legislature explained that it was
prohibiting the award of government contracts to business entities that contribute
to political candidates because of a “compelling interest” in “protecting the
integrity of government contractual decisions and of improving the public’s
confidence in government.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.13 (Supp. 2007). It
explained:
There exists the perception that campaign contributions are often made
to a State or county political party committee by an individual or business
seeking favor with State elected officials, with the understanding that the
money given to such a committee will be transmitted to other committees
in other parts of the State, or is otherwise intended to circumvent legal
restrictions on the making of political contributions or gifts directly to
elected State officials, thus again making elected State officials beholden
to those contributors . . . .
Id.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1342 (Supp. 2006).
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happens to be a sole proprietorship, individual political
11
contributions would not be involved.
Most pay-to-play legislation, however, also encompasses
contributions from other individuals closely associated with a state
contractor. For example, Connecticut’s law completely bans
certain political contributions from “principals” of state contractors
12
and prospective state contractors. The principals of a business
entity include the following groups: (1) members of the board of
13
14
directors; (2) owners of five percent or more of the business; (3)
the president, treasurer, and executive vice president (or other
15
chief executive officer); (4) employees who have “managerial or
16
discretionary responsibilities with respect to a state contract;” (5)
spouses and dependent children over eighteen-years old of any of
17
the above; and (6) political committees (including political action
committees, or “PACs”) “established or controlled” by any of the
18
other or by the state contractor itself. The business entity itself is
19
flatly barred from making a political contribution.
In New Jersey, a business entity that contracts with the state
may not make any reportable political contributions during the
11. West Virginia’s law facially extends only to the “person” who actually
enters into a contract with the state. See W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(d) (2006)
(providing that “no person entering into any contract with the State” may make
certain political contributions).
12. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g)(2)(A)–(B) (Supp. 2007). Although
Connecticut’s law applies equally to state contractors and prospective state
contractors, this article generally refers only to state contractors. The term “state
contractor” can include any “person, business entity or nonprofit organization that
enters into a state contract.” Id. at subdiv. (g)(1)(D). “Business entity” is defined
in the statute to include, among other things,
[s]tock corporations, banks, insurance companies, business associations,
bankers associations, insurance associations, trade or professional
associations which receive funds from membership dues and other
sources, partnerships, joint ventures, private foundations . . . ; trusts or
estates; [certain other] corporations . . . ; cooperatives, and any other
association, organization or entity which is engaged in the operation of a
business or profit-making activity.
Id. § 9-601(8).
13. Id. § 9-612(g)(1)(F).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. The statute explains that “managerial or discretionary responsibilities”
means that the person has “substantive responsibilities with respect to the
negotiation of the state contract.” Id. at subdiv. (g)(1)(H).
17. Id. at subdiv. (g)(1)(F).
18. Id.
19. See id. § 9-613.
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20

term of the contract. “Business entity” is defined in the statute to
include not only to the state contractor itself, but also (1) any
principal who owns or controls more than ten percent of the
profits, assets, or stock of the company; (2) any indirect or direct
subsidiary of the company; (3) any PAC directly or indirectly
controlled by any of the above; and (4) if the state contractor is a
21
natural person, the individual’s cohabitating spouse or child. A
similar ban applies to a business entity that contracts with a county
22
or municipal government.
Ohio’s law is less burdensome than Connecticut’s or New
Jersey’s, although it still applies to a large group of contributors. It
does not flatly prohibit political contributions from state
23
contractors. Instead it imposes aggregate limits on the political
20. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:44A-20.15, –20.16 (Supp. 2007) (defining
“contribution” to include only reportable contributions). A contribution is
reportable if it is more than $300. See id. § 19:44A-8(d). “[A]ny natural or legal
person, business corporation, professional services corporation, limited liability
company, partnership, limited partnership, business trust, association or any other
legal commercial entity organized under the laws of this State or of any other state
or foreign jurisdiction” is considered a “business entity.” Id. § 19:44A-20.17. See
also id. § 19:44A-20.7 (same definition applied to county and municipal contracts).
A business entity that seeks to obtain a state contract is also subject to certification
and reporting requirements. See id. § 19:44A-20.8 (requiring state legislative
agencies, counties, and municipalities to obtain written certification from a
business entity that it has not made a prohibited contract prior to the award of the
contract and requiring the business entity to report any improper contribution it
makes during the duration of the contract); § 19:44A-20.18 (requiring the state to
require a report of a business entity’s political contributions for the previous four
years prior to the award of a state contract); § 19:44A-20.19 (requiring the state to
obtain a written certification from a business entity that it has not made a
prohibited contribution prior to the award of a contract and requiring the
business entity to report any improper contribution it makes during the duration
of the contract); § 19:44A-20.26(a) (requiring a state, county, or municipality to
obtain a list of political contributions made during the preceding twelve-month
period within ten days of entering into certain state contracts). Every contract and
bid application must contain a provision indicating that compliance with the payto-play law is a material term. See id. § 19:44A-20.24.
21. See id. § 19:44A-20.17.
22. See id. § 19:44A-20.4 (regarding county contracts); § 19:44A-20.5
(regarding municipal contracts). The only difference is that the provisions
regarding county and municipal government specifically exempt contracts entered
into through a “fair and open process.” Id. See also id. § 19:44A-20.6 (providing for
application to an entity having an interest in the business entity and the spouse or
child of the business entity, when the entity is a natural person); § 19:44A-20.7
(defining “business entity,” “interest,” and “fair and open process”).
23. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.13(I)(3) (Supp. 2007) (regarding
unincorporated state contractors); § 3517.13(J)(3) (regarding incorporated state
contractors).
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contributions of certain individuals associated with state
24
contractors. For incorporated state contractors, the contribution
limits apply to owners of more than twenty percent of the
corporation, as well as their spouses and children between ages
25
Such persons may not make political
seven and seventeen.
contributions totaling more than $1000 from the date of the
contract through one year following the conclusion of the
26
contract. In addition, these owners, spouses, and children, along
with any political action committee (“PAC”) affiliated with the state
contractor, are subject to a combined aggregate limit of $2000
27
during this time period.
Kentucky’s law is the most lenient of those surveyed. It
subjects state contractors, and those associated with state
contractors, to the same contribution limits as other individuals and
28
But if a state contractor, or a person who has a
entities.
substantial interest in a state contractor, contributes more to a
candidate for governor or lieutenant governor than is allowed by
law, the state contractor may not enter into a contract during the
term of office following the campaign, unless the contract has been
29
obtained through competitive bidding. A natural person has a
“substantial interest” in a state contractor if the person, together
with his or her immediate family members, owns or controls ten
30
percent or more of the state contractor.

24. Any state contractor must certify in the contract that it and the individuals
associated with it are in compliance with the political contribution limits. See id.
§ 3517.13(I)(3) (regarding unincorporated state contractors); § 3517.13(J)(3)
(regarding incorporated state contractors).
25. See id. § 3517.13(J)(2)(a). The law only takes into account owners for the
entire period of the contract. Id.
26. Id.
27. See id. § 3517.13(J)(2)(b). For unincorporated state contractors, the
$1,000 individual limit applies to an individual, partner or owner, shareholder (of
an association), an executor of an estate, or a trustee, as well as to spouses and
children between ages seven and seventeen-years old. See id. § 3517.13(I)(2)(a).
The $2,000 combined aggregate limit also encompasses an affiliated PAC. See id.
§ 3517.13(I)(2)(b).
28. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.056(2) (Supp. 2007) (citing contribution
limits in section 121.150).
29. See id. § 121.056(2).
30. See id. at subdiv. (2)(a).
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B. Recipients Targeted
1.

State Officials

States with pay-to-play laws that apply to the narrowest class of
recipients prohibit contributions only to the public official actually
in a position to determine the award of the state contract. South
Carolina’s narrowly tailored pay-to-play law, for instance, prohibits
a person who has been awarded a state contract from contributing
to the public official who “was in a position to act on the contract’s
31
award.” Similarly, Ohio’s law addresses only contributions “to the
holder of the public office having ultimate responsibility for the
award of the contract or to the public officer’s campaign
32
Kentucky’s law addresses only contributions to
committee.”
33
candidates for governor and lieutenant governor.
West Virginia’s law affects the broadest range of candidates.
That state’s law restricts state contractors from making any political
contribution to any candidate for public office or, in fact, “to any
34
person for political purposes or use.”
Other state pay-to-play provisions fall somewhere in the middle
of these two extremes. New Jersey bases its restrictions on whether
the contract is with a municipal, county, or state government.
Municipal contractors may not contribute to municipal elected
35
officials or municipal political parties. County contractors may
not contribute to county elected officials or county political

31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1342 (Supp. 2006). The provision also prohibits a
state contractor from investing “in a financial venture in which [the] public
official has an interest.” Id. See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.056(2) (Supp. 2007)
(applying only to contributions to candidates for governor and lieutenant
governor).
32. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.13(I)(1) (Supp. 2007); § 3517.13(J)(1)
(Supp. 2007).
33. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.056 (Supp. 2007).
34. See W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(d) (2006) (prohibiting a state contractor from
making “any contribution to any political party, committee or candidate for public
office or to any person for political purposes or use.”). Note, however, that West
Virginia’s restrictions on contributors covered are not so broad. Facially, West
Virginia’s law appears to only prohibit contributions from the state contractor
itself. Cf. id. § 3-8-8(b) (allowing a corporation to communicate with its
stockholders and executive on any subject—including, presumably to encourage
individual political contributions—and to administer a separate segregated fund
that can contribute to candidates); § 3-8-12(d) (specifically exempting activities
that are permissible under § 3-8-8 from the pay-to-play provision).
35. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.5 (Supp. 2007).
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36

parties.
State contractors may not contribute to gubernatorial
37
candidates.
Connecticut bases its restrictions on the branch of government
38
involved in the contract. If the contract involves the executive
branch, the law prohibits the state contractor from making political
contributions to the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney
general, state comptroller, secretary of state, or state treasurer (or
39
to any of their committees). On the other hand, if the contract
involved involves the state legislature, the law prohibits the state
contractor from making political contributions to candidates for
state senator or state representative (or either of their
40
committees). One exception applies to certain prospective state
contractors; if a prospective state contractor holds a valid
prequalification certificate issued by the Commissioner of
Administrative Services, it may not contribute to either executive or
41
legislative candidates or committees.
2.

Political Parties

Three states surveyed target so-called “back door”
contributions by barring political contributions from state
contractors (and associated individuals) to political party
committees, as well as to individual candidates. For instance,
individuals subject to West Virginia’s pay-to-play law are prohibited
from making any political contribution to a political party located
42
in the state. New Jersey’s and Connecticut’s laws contain similar
43
bans. The pay-to-play laws of Kentucky, Ohio, and South Carolina
do not limit contributions to political parties.
36. See id. § 19:44A-20.4.
37. See id. § 19:44A-20.15.
38. Connecticut’s pay-to-play statute does not facially apply to contracts with
local governmental units; it defines “state contract” to include agreements and
contracts “with the state or any state agency or any quasi-public agency.” CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g)(1)(C) (Supp. 2007).
39. Id. § 9-612(g)(2)(A).
40. See id. at subdiv. (g)(2)(B). Principals of state contractors and prospective
state contractors may still establish exploratory or candidate committees for their
own campaigns. Id. at subdiv. (g)(4).
41. Id. at subdivs. (g)(2)(A)–(B).
42. See W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(d) (2006) (prohibiting a person entering into a
state contract from making any direct or indirect contribution to any political
party).
43. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g)(2)(A)–(B) (prohibiting contributions
from a state contractor to a party committee, regardless of whether the contract
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C. Types of Contracts Targeted
1.

Competitive versus Non-competitive Bidding

Three of the states’ pay-to-play laws—those of Kentucky, New
Jersey, and South Carolina—provide an exception (at least in part)
for state contractors involved in contracts not awarded through an
44
open, competitive bidding process. For example, the part of New
Jersey’s law dealing with county and municipal contracts exempts
45
those awarded pursuant to a “fair and open process.” “Fair and
open process” is defined to mean that the contract is publicly
advertised, proposals are publicly solicited, the contract is awarded
under publicly available criteria, and the contract is publicly
46
announced when awarded.
Despite these requirements for
county and municipal contracts, however, the provisions of New
Jersey law regarding state contracts apply regardless of whether the
47
contract is awarded pursuant to a “fair and open process.”
2.

Monetary Thresholds

Three states—Connecticut, New Jersey, and Ohio—regulate
contributions only when an entity’s state contracts reach certain
monetary thresholds.
Connecticut’s law applies only to
relationships resulting from a single state contract with a value of
$50,000 or more or a series of contracts with a value of $100,000 or
involves the executive or legislative branches of government); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
19:44A-20.4 (Supp. 2007) (prohibiting contributions from a county contractor to a
county committee of a political party “if a member of that political party is serving
in an elective public office of that county when the contract is awarded”); §
19:44A-20.5 (prohibiting contributions from a municipal contractor to a
municipal committee of a political party “if a member of that political party is
serving in an elective public office of that municipality when the contract is
awarded”); § 19:44A-20.15 (prohibiting contributions from a state contractor to
“any State or county political party committee prior to the completion of the
contract or agreement.”).
44. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.056(2) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2007);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1342 (Supp. 2007).
45. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.4 (Supp. 2007) (regarding contracts with
county governments and municipal governments).
46. Id. § 19:44A-20.7.
47. See id. § 19:44A-20.14 (discussing contracts with state governments, but
not including any language limiting the provision’s application to contracts not
awarded pursuant to a “fair and open process”). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3517.13 (I)–(J) (Supp. 2007) (not containing any language limiting application
to competitively bid contracts).
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48

more in a fiscal year. New Jersey’s provisions generally apply only
49
to contracts above $17,500. Ohio’s provisions apply to contracts
50
valued at more than $500.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The Supreme Court has recently confirmed, in a plurality
opinion, that limits on the rights of individuals to make political
contributions “‘implicate fundamental First Amendment interests,’
namely, the freedoms of ‘political expression’ and ‘political
51
association.’” By making a political contribution, an individual is
able to “express[] . . . support” for a candidate and the candidate’s
52
views, as well as to “affiliate . . . with a candidate.”
Because contribution limits “involve[] little direct restraint” on
communication, the Supreme Court has subjected contribution
limits to a lower standard of scrutiny than expenditure limits, which
are thought to directly affect an individual’s ability to engage in
53
communication. Nonetheless, contribution limits are still subject
54
to some intermediate level of “exacting scrutiny.” In Randall v.
Sorrell, the Supreme Court’s most recent case dealing with

48. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g)(1)(C)–(D) (Supp. 2007) (defining “state
contractor” and “prospective state contractor” to apply to such relationships). The
state contract must involve (1) the rendition of personal services; (2) the
furnishing of material, supplies, or equipment; (3) the construction, alteration, or
repair of any public building or public work; (4) the acquisition, sale, or lease of
any land or building; (5) a licensing agreement; or (6) a grant, loan, or loan
guarantee. Id. at subdiv. (g)(1)(C).
49. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.4 (Supp. 2007) (dealing with contracts
with county governments); § 19:44A-20.5 (dealing with contracts with municipal
governments); § 19:44A-20.14 (dealing with contracts with the state government).
50. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.13(I)–(J) (Supp. 2007).
51. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2491 (2006) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976)).
52. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 22.
53. Id. at 21. The Buckley Court explained, “A contribution serves as a general
expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate
the underlying basis for the support.” Id. The Court explained that the size of an
individual’s contribution did little more than “provide[] a very rough index of the
intensity of the contributor’s support for the candidate.” Id. Nonetheless, the
individual could still freely “discuss candidates and issues.” Id. See also Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm’n v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 610 (1996) (“The
provisions that the Court found constitutional [in prior campaign finance cases]
mostly imposed contribution limits.”); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 259–60 (1986) (“We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions
require less compelling justification than restrictions on independent spending.”).
54. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000).
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contribution limits, the Court invalidated a Vermont statute that
55
imposed what it viewed as overly restrictive contribution limits.
Justice Breyer, joined in his plurality opinion by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, explained that “[contribution] limits
might sometimes work more harm to protected First Amendment
56
interests than their anticorruption objectives could justify.”
Therefore, contribution limits were subject to “some lower
57
bound.” Otherwise, “the constitutional risks to the democratic
58
electoral process become too great.”
Justice Breyer did not
identify any specific level at which contribution limits could be too
low, but he found that Vermont’s contribution limits contained
“danger signs” because the limits were “sufficiently low as to
59
generate suspicion that they [were] not closely drawn.”
After pointing out that Vermont’s contribution limits were the
lowest in the nation and well below limits previously upheld by the
Court, Justice Breyer noted five specific problems with the low
limits. First, the statute’s limits were likely to “significantly restrict
the amount of funding available for challengers,” particularly in
60
hotly contested races.
Second, the low limits also applied to
political parties, which would have made it difficult for political
parties to engage in coordinated activities and “threaten[ed] harm
61
to . . . the right to associate in a political party.” Third, the low
limits applied to expenses incurred by political volunteers, which
would impede the ability of individuals to associate with political
62
campaigns.
Fourth, the low limits were not adjusted for

55. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2500. Under the Vermont law, Act 64, each
individual, political committee, or political party was limited to contributing a total
of $200 to $400 to each candidate for each two-year general election cycle. Id. at
2486. These limits were not indexed for inflation. Id.
56. Id. at 2491–92 (citing Nixon, 528 U.S. at 395–97; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21).
57. Id. at 2492.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2492–93.
60. Id. at 2494–95.
61. Id. at 2496; see also Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574
(2000); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357 (1997); Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm’n. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996); Norman v.
Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288 (1992); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1976)
(explaining that contribution limits are “only a marginal restriction” on First
Amendment rights, since a contributor can still associate in other ways).
62. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2498. Act 64 excluded volunteer activities from its
definition of “contribution.” Id. (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801(2) (2002)).
However, Act 64 did not exclude expenses incurred while performing those
volunteer activities. See id.
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63

inflation. Finally, Vermont had failed to put forth any “special
justification that might warrant a contribution limit so low or so
restrictive as to bring about the serious associational and expressive
64
problems that we have described.”
Accordingly, Justice Breyer
concluded that the statute’s contribution limits were not “narrowly
65
tailored.” Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in
the holding on the grounds that contribution limits are subject to
66
strict scrutiny and Vermont’s limits did not pass this test. Justice
Kennedy concurred and agreed with the “exacting scrutiny”
67
employed by the plurality.
After Randall, it appears that six justices—a majority of the
current Court—would apply some heightened level of review to
68
contribution limits. At a minimum, contribution limits must be
justified by some “sufficiently important interest” and “closely
69
drawn” to match that interest.
IV. APPLICATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES TO STATE PAYTO-PLAY LEGISLATION
Under the principles cited above, state legislation limiting
political contributions can only survive constitutional review if it is
70
closely tailored to a substantial state interest.
State pay-to-play
legislation is aimed at what is almost certainly an adequate state
71
interest in preventing corruption. But some state legislation may
not be closely tailored to this interest.

63. Id. at 2499.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 2502 (Thomas, J., concurring).
67. See id. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68. See Rachel Gage, Note, Randall v. Sorrell: Campaign Finance Regulation and
the First Amendment as a Facilitator of Democracy, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 341, 359–68
(2007) (discussing the attitudes of each of the justices towards a heightened level
of review for political contributions).
69. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2491; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 387 (2000) (“[U]nder Buckley’s standard of scrutiny, a contribution limit
involving ‘significant interference’ with associational rights could survive if the
Government demonstrated that contribution regulation was ‘closely drawn’ to
match a ‘sufficiently important interest,’ though the dollar amount of the limit
need not be ‘fine tuned.’”).
70. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2491.
71. See id.
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A. Preventing Corruption and Quid Pro Quos is Clearly a Substantial
State Interest
The Supreme Court has made clear that state governments
have an interest in preventing potential state contractors from
buying access to the market by making political contributions to
those who are in a position to decide who will receive a state
72
contract. “[T]he prevention of corruption and the appearance of
corruption” is a “constitutionally sufficient justification” for
73
imposing contribution limits. This corruption interest includes an
74
interest in preventing actual or perceived quid pro quos.
Additionally, quid pro quo arrangements are not the only
75
opportunities for “improper influence” of the election process.
Improper influence can also result from “the broader threat from
76
politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”
72. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2007) (“This
Court has long recognized ‘the governmental interest in preventing corruption
and the appearance of corruption’ in election campaigns.”) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976)); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 496–497 (1985) [hereinafter NCPAC] (“We held in Buckley and
reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent Control that preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government
interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.”); First Nat’l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978) (“The importance of the
governmental interest in preventing [corruption] has never been doubted.”).
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s holdings in this regard are certainly open to
criticism. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption &
Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 119 (2004) (arguing that “trends in public perception of corruption may
have little to do with the campaign finance system”); Bradley A. Smith, Money
Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 63 (1997)
(arguing that reformers have “overstated the governmental interest in the
anticorruption rationale” and “anything beyond disclosure” cannot be narrowly
tailored to this interest).
73. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 26.
74. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497 (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid
pro quo: dollars for political favors.”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27 (“To the extent
that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current
and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined.”); see also Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 943 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (“In every case where a quid in the electoral process is being exchanged for
a quo in a particular market where the government deals, the corruption in the
market is simply the flipside of the electoral corruption.”).
75. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28).
76. Id.; see also NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497 (“Corruption is a subversion of the
political process. Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their
obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of
money into their campaigns.”).
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Thus, a legislative body may “constitutionally address the power of
money ‘to influence governmental action’ in ways less ‘blatant and
77
specific’ than bribery.” In particular, a “perception of corruption
[is] ‘inherent in a regime of large individual financial
contributions’ to candidates for public office” and is “a source of
78
concern ‘almost equal’ to quid pro quo improbity.”
Connecticut’s law, for example, is clearly intended to address
the above state interests. A federal district court assessing the law
(but not on constitutional grounds) explained:
The statute seeks to restore public confidence in the
integrity of state government and to eliminate corruption
and undue influence flowing from campaign
contributions given or solicited by certain special
interests. The law also seeks to eliminate the appearance
of corruption flowing from such contributions and to
promote transparency in campaign financing and state
79
contracting.
Nonetheless, the fact that state pay-to-play laws may be
intended to combat legitimate state interests does not mean that
the means used to achieve these legitimate ends are appropriate.
B. Some State Pay-to-Play Laws May Not be Closely Tailored
The real issue with state pay-to-play legislation is whether such
legislation is closely tailored to a state’s interest in preventing state
contractors from using political contributions to “buy” state
contracts. The pay-to-play laws of the six states surveyed in this
article generally fall into four categories: (1) laws that do not
actually restrict political contributions, (2) laws that restrict
contributions only from the state contractor itself to the public
official in a position to award the contract, (3) laws that restrict
77. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28); see also United
States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961) (“Democracy is
effective only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound
to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which
arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.”).
78. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 390 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27); see also McConnell
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003) (“Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as
classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues
not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the
wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the
officeholder.”).
79. Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n v. Garfield, 469 F. Supp. 2d 25, 38 (D.
Conn. 2007).
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contributions from a broad class of contributors, but only to the
public official in a position to award the contract, (4) laws that
restrict contributions only from the state contractor itself, but to a
broad class of state officials or to political parties, and (5) laws that
restrict contributions from a broad class of contributors to a broad
class of state officials or to political parties. While state laws in
categories (1) through (4) would most likely pass constitutional
scrutiny, state laws in category (5) seem unconstitutionally
overbroad.
1.

A Law that Does Not Actually Restrict Political Contributions

Kentucky’s law applies to a broad class of contributors and
recipients. But this law is different from the other laws surveyed
because the law does nothing to limit an individual’s ability to
make political contributions equal to those made by other
individuals not associated with a state contractor. Rather, it merely
imposes an additional penalty on state contractors when they (or
their owners and immediate family members) make contributions
exceeding the general limits: such state contractors may not obtain
80
any state contract that has not been competitively bid.
Thus,
Kentucky’s law is not imposing any additional restrictions on the
ability of individuals to participate in the political process by
making political contributions. This law appears constitutional.
2. Laws Restricting Contributions Only From the State Contractor
Itself to the Public Official in a Position to Award the Contract
State law limiting contributions from an entity that hopes to
contract with the state to the public official in a position to award a
contract seems to be closely tailored, since it directly targets quid
pro quos between the contributor and the recipient. South
Carolina’s law is an example, as it prohibits contributions only from
the state contractor itself to the public official “in a position to act
81
on the contract’s award.” On its face, this law only affects political
contributions from one person (the state contractor itself) to
another (the public official acting on the contract’s award). In
80. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.056(2) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2007).
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1342 (Supp. 2006). The provision also prohibits a
state contractor from investing “in a financial venture in which [the] public
official has an interest.” Id. See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.056(2) (LexisNexis
2004 & Supp. 2007) (applying only to contributions to candidates for governor
and lieutenant governor).
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fact, the only situation in which the law would affect an individual’s
political contributions would be in the event that the state
82
contractor was a sole proprietorship.
“[A] showing of one
affected individual does not point up a system of suppressed
83
political advocacy that would be unconstitutional.” Thus, South
Carolina’s law probably could pass constitutional scrutiny because it
is closely tailored to the perceived problem South Carolina is
seeking to avoid.
3. Laws Restricting Contributions From a Broad Class of
Contributors, but Only to the Public Official in a Position to
Award the Contract
Ohio’s law also applies to a broad group of potential
contributors; however, it is limited in its application to recipients.
For instance, for an incorporated state contractor, the act applies
to contributions by any 20% owner, as well as that owner’s spouse,
84
and any child between seven and seventeen years of age. But the
only contributions barred are those to “the holder of the public
office having ultimate responsibility for the award of that
85
contract.” Furthermore, the context of the statute suggests that
only one public official would ever have “ultimate responsibility”
86
Thus, the
for the award of any particular state contract.
restriction on any individual’s general ability to make political
contributions seems slight; in most cases, an individual would be
prohibited from making a political contribution to only one state
87
88
official. This law also seems to be closely tailored.
82. Cf. Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (determining that
MSRB Rule G-37, regulating pay-to-play in the municipal securities business, is
constitutional because it “constrains relations only between the two potential
parties to a quid pro quo: the underwriters and their municipal finance employees
on the one hand, and officials who might influence the award of negotiated
municipal bond underwriting contracts on the other.”).
83. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 396 (2000).
84. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.13(J)(2)(a) (Supp. 2007).
85. Id.
86. For instance, the statute provides that when the “public officer who is
responsible for the award of a contract is appointed by the governor . . . the office
of the governor is considered to have ultimate responsibility for the award of the
contract.” § 3517.13(K)(1). See also § 3517.13(K)(2) (regarding appointees by the
elected chief executive officer of a municipal corporation).
87. The prohibition could extend further if a particular state contractor
entered into multiple contracts involving different public officials. But in most
instances, a state contractor with multiple contracts likely would be involved in
repeated contracts with the same agency.
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Laws Restricting Contributions Only From the State Contractor
Itself, but to a Broad Class of State Officials or to Political Parties

In terms of contributors and recipients affected, West Virginia
has taken an approach almost directly opposite to Ohio. West
Virginia’s restriction facially applies to only one contributor: the
89
state contractor itself. But the law bans contributions from the
state contractor to any political party, committee, or candidate.
Federal campaign finance law uses an approach similar to West
Virginia’s; a U.S. government contractor is flatly banned from
90
making any direct or indirect political contributions. But, a U.S.
government contractor may still establish a PAC and employees of
the contractor may make individual political contributions, so long
91
as they are not indirect contributions from the contractor itself.
West Virginia’s law, like the federal law, appears to be narrowly
tailored. The state law only restricts contributions from the state
92
contractor itself.
Therefore, unless the state contractor is a
natural person, the law does not prohibit political contributions
from individuals. At the same time, the law applies to both indirect
93
and direct contributions from the state contractor. Thus, the law
addresses the problem of a state contractor using its employees as a
“pass-through” for the contractor’s political contributions, while
allowing employees of a state contractor to freely make political
contributions that have not been directed by their employer.

88. The D.C. Circuit has deemed an analogous rule—Rule G-37 of the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board—to be constitutional. See Blount v. SEC,
61 F.3d 938, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Rule G-37 prohibits municipal securities
brokers and dealers, associated professionals, and PACs controlled by municipal
securities brokers, dealers, and professionals, from contributing to the political
campaigns of “an official of the issuer who can, directly or indirectly, influence the
awarding of municipal securities business.” Self Regulatory Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 33,868, 56 SEC Docket 1045 (Apr. 7, 1994). “Municipal
securities business” includes only business that is not competitively bid. Id.
89. W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(d) (2006).
90. 2 U.S.C. § 441c(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting any person who enters into a
contract with the United States from directly or indirectly making “any
contribution of money or other things of value” or promising “expressly or
impliedly to make any such contribution to any political party, committee, or
candidate for public office or to any person for any political purpose or use . . . .”).
91. See id. at subdiv. (b) (allowing government contractors to establish
separate segregated funds, but prohibiting “indirect” contributions from
government contractors).
92. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 396 (2000).
93. W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(d) (2006).
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5. Laws Restricting Contributions From a Broad Class of
Contributors to a Broad Class of State Officials or to Political
Parties
In each of the examples above, the state has enacted a law that
affects contributions by state contractors, but has limited the
application of the law either: (a) to those contributors who are
most likely to make contributions in order to influence the award
of a contract, (b) to those recipients who are most likely to be
influenced by contributors to award a contract, or (c) to both
groups. New Jersey’s and Connecticut’s laws have a much broader
application.
a.

Connecticut

Connecticut’s law is broader than New Jersey’s law.
Connecticut’s pay-to-play statute limits contributions not only from
the employee who would actually administer a state contract, but
from many other individuals who either have leadership
responsibility or ownership interest in the business entity seeking to
94
contract with the state. However, the law does not stop there. It
also applies to the spouse or dependent child (over eighteen-years
95
old) of any of these individuals.
Connecticut’s law prohibits all these individuals from making a
wide range of political contributions. If the contract involves the
executive branch, these individuals are prohibited from
contributing to any state-wide officer, as well as to any state political
96
party. In addition, once an unacceptable political contribution
has occurred, the state agency involved in the contract may void an
existing contract and is prohibited from awarding any additional
97
contract.
Imagine the following scenario: ABC Corp. seeks to contract
with the Connecticut Department of the Treasury. X is a member

94. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g)(1)(F) (Supp. 2007) (including an
individual who is a member of the board of directors, an individual who is
employed by a state contractor or senior vice president, an individual who is a
chief executive officer, and an individual who has managerial or discretionary
responsibilities with respect to a state contract).
95. Id.
96. See id. at subdiv. (g)(2)(A) (prohibiting contributions to the governor,
lieutenant governor, attorney general, state comptroller, secretary of state, or state
treasurer).
97. Id. at subdiv. (g)(2)(C).
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of ABC Corp.’s board of directors. X’s spouse, Y, contributes to the
candidate for state attorney general, not because Y has any
intention of influencing the award of the state contract (Y may not
even be aware that contract negotiations are occurring), but
because Y supports the attorney general candidate’s views on drug
control, consumer protection, or any number of issues entirely
unrelated to the state contract. Under Connecticut’s law, Y could
unilaterally affect ABC Corp.’s ability to obtain a state contract.
Connecticut’s law does contain an exception for “mitigating
98
circumstances.” But it is unclear whether and how this exception
would apply to this scenario, and it seems likely that in these
circumstances the Department of the Treasury would simply
choose another contractor if faced with a choice between ABC
Corp. and another prospective state contractor with a clean bill of
health. Connecticut’s law also contains a clause allowing for the
99
return of an improper contribution within thirty days. But within
thirty days a contract might already be awarded. More importantly,
requiring Y to obtain a refund still affects Y’s ability to participate
in the political process by contributing to Y’s candidate of choice.
The prohibition on contributions to political parties
exacerbates this problem. By completely barring all political
contributions from certain individuals associated with state
contractors to political parties, Connecticut’s law hampers the
100
ability of these individuals to associate with political parties.
Furthermore, the limitation is overbroad because these individuals,
many of which may have no close connection to a state contract,
could contribute to political parties for a variety of reasons other
101
than as part of an effort to secure a state contract.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct 2479, 2496 (2006) (discussing the “important
political right” of being able to “associate in a political party . . .”); see also Cal.
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000) (“Representative democracy in
any populous unit of governance is unimaginable without the ability of citizens to
band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their
political views.”); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357
(1997) (“The First Amendment protects the right of citizens to associate and to
form political parties for the advancement of common political goals and ideas.”);
Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288 (1992) (“[T]his Court has recognized the
constitutional right of citizens to create and develop new political parties.”).
101. In a suit filed against the director of the Connecticut State Elections
Enforcement Commission, the plaintiffs argued that Connecticut failed to show
any connection between contributions by those the new law considers to be
“principals” of state contractors and the award of state contracts. See Plaintiffs’
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Certainly some individuals might contribute to a political party
in response to a request by a particular official who is in a position
to award a state contract, or might earmark contributions to a party
for a particular state candidate in an effort to get around rules
forbidding direct contributions to candidates. But these problems
can be solved in other ways. For example, Connecticut could ban
“indirect” contributions by state contractors to certain state
102
officials, as West Virginia has done.
Connecticut could also
prohibit earmarked contributions or contributions made at the
request of another.
Furthermore, Connecticut’s law does not merely limit political
contributions by the individuals affected; it outright bans all
political contributions from these individuals to the relevant
103
branch of government or to political parties.
A federal district
court has recently described the application of the law to spouses
and children “as a prophylactic measure to prevent state
contractors from circumventing the statute by using their
104
immediate family as a conduit.”
Nonetheless, there is a
significant difference between limiting contributions from
individuals associated with state contractors and prohibiting any
105
Barring a minimal
contributions from these same individuals.
Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., at 68–71, Green Party of Conn. v.
Garfield, No. 3:06-cv-1030 (D. Conn. July 13, 2007).
102. See W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(d) (2006). See also 2 U.S.C. § 441c (prohibiting
direct and indirect contributions from federal government contractors).
103. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(g)(2) (Supp. 2007).
104. Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts Ass’n v. Garfield, 469 F. Supp. 2d 25, 38–39 (D.
Conn. 2007) (discussing Kaplan v. Bd. of Educ., 759 F.2d 256, 261 (2d Cir. 1985)).
See also Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (in relation to pay-to-play
in the municipal securities field, explaining that “actors in this field are
presumably shrewd enough to structure their relations rather indirectly . . .”). The
court in Garfield was dealing with the issue of whether to grant a preliminary
injunction to the plaintiffs to prevent enforcement of a provision of the state’s payto-play law requiring Internet disclosure of minor children of principals of state
contractors. See Garfield, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 28. The court granted the preliminary
injunction on the basis that the state had not sufficiently tailored the disclosure
requirement to its interest in restoring public confidence in the integrity of state
government. See id. at 38–41. The state legislature subsequently amended the bill
to only prohibit contributions by and require disclosure of dependent children
over eighteen years of age. See Conn. Gen. Assembly, Public Act No. 07-1, 2007 Ct.
ALS 1 (Jan. Sess. 2007).
105. Cf. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985) (explaining that even if “the large
pooling of financial resources by [the two PACs discussed in the opinion] and
FCM did pose a potential for corruption or the appearance of corruption,”
Congress’s legislative “response to that evil” was “fatally overbroad” because it
applied equally to “multimillion dollar war chests” and “informal discussion
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contribution from the spouse of an individual only tangentially
involved with procuring a state contract hardly seems justified, even
106
from an anti-corruption standpoint.
Finally, the law applies to all state contractors involved in
107
It is not limited in
contracts above a threshold amount.
application—as are other states’ laws—to those contracts most
likely to be awarded through shrewd and surreptitious processes,
such as those that only regulate state contractors involved in non108
competitively bid contracts.
Accordingly, Connecticut’s pay-toplay law does not appear to be closely tailored to the state interest
109
of avoiding corruption in government.

groups that solicit neighborhood contributions”). Similarly, even if pay-to-play
poses a true threat to public confidence in government, Connecticut’s law
attempts to combat that threat by banning many absolutely harmless political
contributions.
106. Cf. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2499 (2006) (discussing Vermont’s
lack of justification for imposing restrictive contribution limits).
107. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-612(g)(1)(C), (g)(2) (Supp. 2007).
108. Cf. MSRB Rule G-37, Exchange Act Release No. 34-33868, 56 SEC Docket
1045 (Apr. 7, 1994) (regarding pay-to-play in the municipal securities business and
exempting, for the most part, contracts obtained through competitive bidding
from the definition of “municipal securities business”).
109. In fact, a similar argument has already been raised. The ACLU filed a
lawsuit in 2006, asserting that the law’s
absolute ban on political contributions and solicitation of contributions
by “communicator lobbyists” (and by their families), and by the officers,
directors and some employees of state contractors and prospective state
contractors (and by their families) violate[d] those individuals’ freedoms
of speech and association, protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, by directly curtailing their ability to engage in political
speech and participate in the political process.
Plaintiffs’ Compl. ¶ 5, Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, No. 3:06-cv-1030 (D.
Conn. July 6, 2006) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-333l(h)–(i), -333n(g)–(j)
(codified as amended CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-610(h)–(i), 9-612(g)–(j) (Supp.
2007))). The lawsuit also alleges constitutional infirmities in the state’s new public
financing program, which was enacted into law as part of the same legislation. See
id. ¶¶ 1–4. But see Casino Ass’n of La. v. State ex rel. Foster, 820 So. 2d 494, 502–04
(La. 2002) (rejecting arguments that a state law prohibiting any political
contributions from any officer, director, trustee, partner, senior management level
employee, or key employee in the casino industry, or the spouse of any of the
foregoing was unconstitutionally broad); Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz,
349 N.E.2d 61, 66–67 (Ill. 1976) (rejecting arguments that a state law prohibiting
any political contributions from any officer, associate, agent, representative, or
employee of a liquor licensee was unconstitutionally broad).
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New Jersey

New Jersey’s law is not nearly as broad as Connecticut’s law,
but it suffers from some of the same infirmities. In most cases, the
law applies to a broad group of contributors and recipients. The
law bans reportable contributions not only from the state
contractor and its owners, but also from spouses and children living
110
with any individual state contractor or owner.
The provisions of New Jersey’s law that apply to municipal and
county contractors ban contributions to any elected municipal or
111
The provisions that apply to state contractors
county official.
112
limit only reportable contributions to gubernatorial candidates.
But regardless of the division of state or local government involved
in the contract, reportable contributions to political parties at that
113
level of government are completely barred.
One redeeming quality to New Jersey’s law is that it only
prohibits “reportable” contributions. Contributions of up to $300
114
are not reportable under state law.
Therefore, those subject to
the law still have some ability to participate in the political process
by making political contributions. Nonetheless, one can still argue
that imposing a $300 contribution limit on individuals not closely
connected to a state contract unnecessarily infringes on the ability
of individuals to make political contributions, particularly when
those limits apply to contributions to political parties as well as to
115
candidates.
New Jersey’s general campaign finance law provides that a
corporation is prohibited from making contributions indirectly
through its officers or employees by providing them with any type
of reimbursement or remuneration for the purpose of making
116
contributions. New Jersey could use a similar approach in its pay110. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:44A-20.4, -20.5, -20.7, -20.17 (Supp. 2007).
111. See id. §§ 19:44A-20.4, -20.5.
112. See id. § 19:44A-20.15.
113. See id. §§ 19:44A-20.4, -20.5, -20.15. State contractors and their principals
also are barred from contributing to county political parties. See id. § 19:44A20.15.
114. See id. § 19:44A-8(d).
115. Generally individuals would be subject to much higher contribution
limits: $2600 per candidate per election, $25,000 per state political party per year,
$37,000 per county political party per year, and $7200 per municipal political
party per year. See N.J. Election Law Enforcement Comm’n, Contribution Limits
Chart: Entities Receiving Contributions (2007), available at http://www.elec.state.nj.us
/ForCandidates/elec_limits.html.
116. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-20.1 (Supp. 2007).
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to-play law to eliminate indirect political contributions by people
unconnected with state contracts, while still allowing individuals
not closely connected to state contracts to make political
contributions.
V. CONCLUSION
Certainly, “[political] [m]oney, like water, will seek its own
level. The price of apparent containment may be uncontrolled
117
flood damage elsewhere.”
Understandably, states passing broad
pay-to-play legislation, such as Connecticut and New Jersey, have
chosen to dam as many avenues for political money as possible.
These states likely enacted such broad bans on political
contributions in hopes that they could keep state contractors from
accomplishing indirectly what they could not do directly.
Nonetheless, to the extent such state laws eliminate the ability
of individuals not associated with the state contracting process to
make any political contributions—and particularly to the extent
these laws bar individuals from contributing to political parties—
such pay-to-play laws seem unconstitutionally overbroad. In the
competitive state contracting market, states certainly have a
legitimate interest in preventing the exchange of political
contributions for political favors, as well as increasing public
confidence in government. But when creating legislation aimed at
this purpose, states should consider whether they could accomplish
this purpose through means less onerous than virtually eliminating
contribution opportunities by individuals not closely tied to state
contracts. They should look past the contributor’s identity to
determine whether a state contractor is really using its employees,
owners, or other persons as pass-throughs for contributions to state
officials. They should also look past the identity of the recipient to
determine whether the contribution has actually been earmarked
for someone else.

117. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1713 (1999).
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